We propose that many seemingly different choice problems consumers make involve fundamentally similar options. Specifically, we argue that across a wide range of problems some options represent more "timid" choices (e.g., compromise, safe, and standard options) whereas other options represent more "bold" choices (e.g., extreme, risky, and unique options). The tendency to select a more timid or bold option is affected by situational cues which trigger a more timid or bold mindset. Several studies demonstrate this distinction between options and the correspondence between mindsets and choice behavior. For example, in some respects, choosing an extreme option can be seen as related to choosing a risky gamble, a unique option, and a hedonic option. Similarly, compromise options, safe options, standard, and utilitarian options have common features and reflect related choice tendencies.
In consumer decision making research and decision research more generally, the focus tends to be on studying individual phenomena, such as identifying conditions that affect preference for compromise options (e.g., Simonson 1989; Drolet 2002) , hedonic options (e.g., Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000) , high risk options (e.g., Thaler and Johnson 1990) , or unique options. However, a closer examination suggests that there are some basic similarities in the options consumers face in seemingly unrelated choice problems.
For example, in some respects, choosing an extreme option can be seen as related to choosing a risky gamble, a unique option, and a hedonic option. Similarly, compromise options, safe options, standard, and utilitarian options have common features and reflect related choice tendencies.
In this research we try to identify such cross-problem similarities, which might allow us to offer more parsimonious explanations and identify factors that moderate choice behavior across seemingly unrelated problem types. In particular, we propose that some options represent more 'timid' choices, and some represent more 'bold' choices.
Choosing compromise, safe, utilitarian, and standard options represent 'timid' choice behavior. Options of this type represent conventional behavior, a desire to fit in, and avoidance of risks. On the other hand, choosing options such as extremes, risky gambles, hedonic options, and unique options represent 'bold' choice behavior. These 'bold' options can be seen as involving more unconventional selections, standing for one's beliefs, and taking risks. Moreover, choosing this type of options may serve to better express one's desires and tastes.
Furthermore, consumers' tendency to select a more timid or bold option across problem types may be systematically affected by (1) situational factors which trigger certain mindsets and (2) individual differences. For example, situational cues that trigger self expression or create a unique environment may create a 'bold' mindset which in turn leads consumers to choose more 'bold' options. Moreover, consumers may have a basic tendency to make more bold or timid actions, regardless of the situation.
Our conceptual distinction between timid and bold choice options and corresponding choice behavior builds on, yet is different from, other constructs that have been previously discussed in the literature, including regulatory focus -prevention vs.
promotion (e.g., Higgins, 1998; Chernev 2004) , uniqueness vs. conformity motivations (e.g., Snyder & Fromkin 1977; Simonson & Nowlis 2000) , and exploratory consumer behavior (e.g., Steenkamp & Baumgartner 1992) . However, in our framework we attempt to provide a more parsimonious construct which partially overlaps with these existing constructs to explain a wide range of choice behaviors.
In the next section we present our conceptual framework and its relation to these other constructs. We then present several studies that demonstrate this distinction between bold and timid choice options and the correspondence between mindsets and choice behavior. Specifically, these studies demonstrate that when consumers are in a 'bold' (vs. 'timid') mindset they are more likely to choose 'bold' (over 'timid') options, across a variety of choice problems.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: THE BOLD-TIMID DIVIDE
Over the past years, consumer decision making research has examined various important choice contexts. A great deal of research has examined the compromise effect, the phenomenon that options gain share when they become the intermediate rather than the extreme option in a choice set (e.g., Simonson 1989; Simonson & Nowlis 2000; Drolet 2002 ). Risk aversion, the preference for low-risk option across various contexts, has been extensively studied by investigating choices between sure gains and risky options, with varying levels of risk (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky 1979; Thaler & Johnson 1990) . Additional important choice contexts are choice between vices and virtues, or between hedonic and utilitarian products (e.g., Wertenbroch 1998; Dhar & Wertenbroch 2000) where consumption of hedonic goods is characterized by affect and sensory experiences while consumption of utilitarian products is characterized by more functional or practical goals; choice between products varying on price and quality where one option is usually less expensive but of lower quality and the other option is of higher quality but more expensive; choice between action and inaction (e.g., Baron & Ritov 1994) ; choice between innovative and traditional products (e.g., Moreau et al. 2001) ; choice between 'impoverished' options that have average values on all attributes and more 'enriched' (mixed-value) options that have values above and below the average (e.g., Shafir 1993; Dhar & Simonson 2003) , and choice between unique and standard objects (e.g., Kim & Markus 1999; Maimaran & Wheeler 2007) .
Most prior investigations of choice behavior have tended to focus on one or two phenomena or domains. For example, Huber et al. (1982) have demonstrated the attraction effect. Drolet (2002) examined how seeking to change choice rules affects the compromise effect and preference for low-price low-quality products. Dhar and Simonson (2003) investigated how adding a 'no-choice' option affects the compromise effect and preference for an impoverished, all-average, option.
In contrast to the more isolated approach, in this research we propose that seemingly different choice options and problems share common underlying aspects or characteristics, which may allow us to predict and explain choice behavior across a wide range of choice problems. Specifically, we propose that different choice options can be classified on a continuum that goes from timid at one end to bold at the other end. In the next section we review related frameworks explaining choice behavior. We then present our proposed distinction between 'bold' and 'timid' choice options,.
Related Frameworks Explaining Choice Behaviors
As we explain in more detail below, our proposed distinction between bold and timid choice options and the corresponding mindsets builds on and is related to other constructs, including regulatory focus -prevention vs. promotion (e.g., Higgins, 1998; Chernev 2004) , uniqueness vs. conformity motivations (e.g., Snyder & Fromkin 1977; Simonson & Nowlis 2000) , and exploratory consumer behavior (e.g., Raju 1980; Steenkamp & Baumgartner 1992) . We first present these related frameworks, and then we present our proposed framework and its relation to these existing constructs.
Regulatory focus theory distinguishes between two motivational statespromotion and prevention. Promotion focus is associated with needs of growth and development and prevention focus is associated with needs of safety and security (e.g., Higgins 2000; Avnet & Higgins 2006) . Moreover, these motivational states may dictate the self-standards activated, such that a promotion state activate an 'ideal' self and prevention state activates an 'ought' self. These motivational states affect also the type of outcomes pursued (presence of positive outcomes vs. absence of negative outcomes) and choices made (e.g., Chernev 2004) . A great deal of research focused on investigating the consequences of fit between these motivational states and situational factors (see e.g., Aaker & Lee 2006 , for a review). For example, a fit between the motivational state (promotion vs. prevention) and the type of highlighted attributes (promotion-eagerness oriented vs. prevention-vigilance oriented) affects the compromise and attraction effects (Levav, Kivetz, & Cho 2006) .
Conformity and uniqueness motivations also affect various behaviors and choice behavior in particular. Specifically, the choices individuals make, as well as other acts, can reflect different values and aspects of the self (Bruner 1990; Kim & Markus 1999; Kim & Drolet 2003) . By choosing a unique option, the individual is able to fulfill his need to appear unique and differentiated. However, preference for uniqueness is not universal, but is rather dependent on various factors, such as culture and values (e.g., Kim & Markus 1999) . Moreover, individuals may differ in their inherent motivations to seek uniqueness, as measured, for example, by the need for uniqueness scale (Snyder & Fromkin 1977) . Finally, situational factors may affect the activation of these inherent motivations, as shown, for example, by Simonson and Nowlis (2000) who found that only when asked to give reasons for their choice, individuals high on need for uniqueness were more likely to choose unconventional options (high-risk and extremes).
Exploratory consumer behaviors, defined as curiosity-motivated behaviors, variety seeking, risk taking and pursuing of innovations (Raju 1980) have been shown to be related to individual predispositions to seek sensation and arousal. In a review by Steenkamp and Baumgartner (1992) it is shown that optimal sensation level, measured by a combination of scales including the arousal seeking scale (Mehrabian & Russell 1973) , the sensation seeking scale (Zuckerman 1979) , and the change seeker index (Garlington & Shimota 1964) , is correlated with variety seeking, risk-taking behaviors, information seeking, but not with innovative behaviors. Other studies (see Steenkamp and
Baumgartner's review) also report relationships between similar measures of exploratory behaviors and these choice behaviors, although they are limited to correctional findings.
The Bold -Timid Divide
Building on these existing constructs, we propose that different choice options and problems share common underlying aspects or characteristics, which may allow us to predict and explain choice behavior across a wide range of choice problems. Specifically, we propose that a wide range of choice options can be classified as either more 'bold' or more 'timid'. Choosing the 'bold' options is associated with behaving in a meaningful manner that better allows for self expression. By choosing these bold options, consumers are better able to differentiate themselves from others and express their own tastes.
Moreover, making bold decisions is associated with taking risks and with choices that are usually harder to justify. Based on this definition of 'bold' choice behavior, we refer to extreme, risky, hedonic, innovative, unique, high-price high-quality, mixed-value and action-oriented options as the 'bold' choices. In all of these examples, the 'bold' option is associated with the needs described above. For example, choosing a unique (over a standard) option is associated with better expressing one's tastes and not conforming to norms and rules, with taking the risk that this unique option will be less liked, and with greater difficulties in justifying choosing this option.
In contrast to this 'bold' choice behavior, other choices represent more 'timid' choice behavior, which in turn is associated with a desire to avoid risks and fit in, with an easier-to-justify behavior, and with conventional choice behavior. Timid choice options include compromise, standard, sure-gains, utilitarian, traditional, low-price low-quality, all-average and inaction-oriented options. In all of these examples, choosing the timid options is associated with the defining constructs of fitting in, and of conventional, default behavior. For example, choosing a traditional product over a more innovative product is considered relatively safe and conventional, and easier to justify.
Building on previous research that identified some similarities between these options (e.g., low risk options and compromise options, Simonson & Nowlis 2000; low- price low-quality options and sure-gains, Simonson, Kramer & Young 2004 ) we seek to expand this classification to a wider range of choice contexts using a broader underlying construct. However, we do not propose that this distinction between 'bold' and 'timid' choice options is universal, but rather, may be dependent on contextual and situational cues, as we demonstrate in our fifth study.
Our proposed distinction between 'bold' and 'timid' differs from the constructs discussed earlier in several ways. First, although the needs associated with promotion or prevention focus may map onto the needs of choosing bold vs. timid options, respectively, as promotion focus is associated with needs of growth and development and prevention focus is associated with needs of safety and security, our distinction is orthogonal to the other components of regulatory focus theory -self standards (ideal vs. ought) and type of outcomes pursued (presence of positive outcomes vs. absence of negative outcomes). Moreover, while research on regulatory focus theory identifies certain attributes as more promotion (or eagerness) oriented, and some as more prevention (or vigilant) oriented (e.g., Aaker & Lee 2001) , our distinction between 'bold' and 'timid' choice options applies to a wide range of choice behaviors and refers to characteristics broader than specific attributes (e.g., composition of the choice set, level of risk, level of uniqueness, etc.) Second, in contrast to need for uniqueness, which assesses chronic motivation to be unique and stand out from others, being bold may also lead to actions that are merely more meaningful and self expressive, and not necessarily unique and different from others' actions. For example, choosing a hedonic option is probably driven more by a desire to express the self and less by a desire to be unique and differentiated from others. Finally, our distinction between 'bold' and 'timid' choice options applies to a wider range of choice behaviors associated than those with exploratory tendencies (e.g., choosing unique, extremes, or hedonic products). Moreover, exploratory tendencies do not serve as the single factor identifying bold and timid choices, which in turn are defined in additional terms of conventionality and level of self-expression.
Bold vs. Timid Mindsets
We further propose that consumers may fluctuate between two mindsets, bold and timid, thus affecting the type of chosen option ('bold' vs. 'timid'). Previous research identified various effects of consumers' mindsets on variety of behaviors and cognitions.
For example, Sassenberg and Moskowitz (2005) found that activation of a creative mindset inhibited activation of automatic stereotypes. Chandran and Morwitz (2005) demonstrate how different goal-related mindsets, induced by different pricing schemes, significantly influenced consumers' cognitions and intentions. Dhar, Huber and Khan (forthcoming) showed how an initial purchase causes a shift in consumer mindset from deliberative browsing to more implemental shopping and hence drives subsequent purchases outside of consumer awareness.
We propose that the 'bold' mindset is associated with a desire to engage in unconventional or more meaningful behaviors, which are better able to differentiate one from others and express the self. The 'timid' mindset, on the other hand, is associated with a desire to fit in and engage in more conventional behaviors. An individual's state of mind is dependent, at least in part, on situational cues. For example, when a sense of uniqueness and differentiation is activated, or when a desire to express the self is activated, a bold mindset may be instigated. When bold and unique cues are absent, or instead there are cues for routine and familiarity, a desire to maintain this state may arise resulting in a timid mindset.
When consumers are in a 'bold' mindset they are more likely to choose 'bold' options in order to maintain this mindset and to fulfill the goals associated with it. In contrast, when in a 'timid' mindset, consumers are more likely to choose the 'timid' options which fit better their current goals and motivations. This correspondence between mindsets and choice behavior builds on previous research discussing how choice can serve to express certain aspects of the self. For example, consumers may seek variety in order to express their uniqueness and differentiate themselves from others (Kim & Drolet 2003; Ariely & Levav 2000) . Similarly, LeBoeuf, Shafir and Belyavsky (2006) report a match between salient identity aspects (e.g., social vs. scholar) and product choice (e.g., 'Cosmopolitan' vs. 'The Economist'). Finally, Simonson and Nowlis (2000) found that only when asked to give reasons, consumers with high chronic need for uniqueness were more likely to make unconventional choices.
Overview of Studies
We conducted five studies to examine this distinction between bold and timid choice options and the corresponding mindsets. In our first study we identify which options are indeed perceived to be more 'bold', or 'self-expressive', and which are more 'timid', or 'conventional'. In Study 2 we find that priming the 'boldness' construct makes consumers more likely to choose 'bold' options (extreme, risky and hedonic options) and that this effect is stronger among those who are predispositionaly low on the primed attribute (e.g., individuals who are low on need for uniqueness and arousal seeking). In studies 3-5 we examine the effect of choosing first the choice domain on the making of bold decisions. As explained in more details in the introduction to these studies, we propose that choosing the choice domain can serve as a means of self expression and may lead to a bold mindset. Indeed, in Study 3 we find that when choosing in their chosen domain, consumers are more likely to choose bold options (mixed-value, high-price highquality, vices, unique, extreme, and risky options). In Study 4 we find that this effect is intensified after a time delay, suggesting that choosing the choice domain affects consumers' motivations. Finally, in Study 5 we show that when the 'bold' option is framed as the status-quo option, the effect of choosing the choice domain is eliminated.
We conclude with directions for future research.
STUDY 1: CLASSIFYING BOLD AND TIMID CHOICE OPTIONS
The purpose of our first study was to examine which choice options are indeed perceived as more 'bold' and more 'self expressive', and which are perceived as more 'timid' and 'conventional'. For that end, participants evaluated the choices that other participants supposedly made in a previous study on four scales: boldness, selfexpressiveness, timidness, and conventionality.
Method
A total of 58 participants (mean age = 32.8, 20% male) were recruited through the online participants pool of Stanford university. They were offered to complete a short questionnaire on the Internet in exchange for a chance to win one of four $25-gift certificates. In order to avoid repetitiveness, 30 participants evaluated choices between compromise and extreme options, choices between risky gambles and sure gains, and choices between high-price high-quality (HP-HQ) options and low-price low-quality (LP-LQ) options, and choice between an innovative and traditional product. The remaining 28 participants evaluated choices between unique and standard objects, all-average and mixed-value options, and choices between hedonic and utilitarian options (see examples in Appendix 1).
For each problem, participants read about the choices that participants supposedly made in a previous study. For example, they read about participant #39 who chose cup #4, which is the unique cup (see Appendix 1), and about participant #87 who chose cup #2, which is a standard cup. They were then asked to evaluate these choices on four 7-point scales (1-not at all to 7-very much): self-expressiveness scale ("how self expressive is this choice of …"), boldness scale ("how bold is this choice of …"), conventionality scale ("how conventional is this choice of …"), and timidness scale ("how timid is this choice of …").
Upon evaluating these choices (participants saw 1-3 problems of each type), participants were presented with two open-ended questions: "how do you understand the word 'bold' in this context of making choices?" and "how ….the word 'timid' in this context …". These measures were included in order to gain initial insights to perceptions of boldness and timidness in this context. Specifically, we wanted to examine whether perceptions converge across consumers to a well-defined construct.
Results and Discussion
As shown in Figures 1A-1B , participants rated choosing the options we define as 'bold' as indeed more 'bold' and more 'self-expressive' than choosing the options we define as 'timid'. Specifically, participants rated choosing the mixed-value, unique, extreme, HP-HQ, hedonic, innovative, and the risky gambles as more bold, more selfexpressive, less conventional, and less timid than choosing the all-average, standard, compromises, LP-LQ, utilitarian, traditional, and sure gains, respectively. For example, the mean rating on the combined boldness and self-expressiveness scales of choosing the risky option was 5.8, whereas choosing the sure gain was rated as 4.0 (t (29) = 6.9, p < .001).
We then compared the percentage of participants who rated the 'bold' options higher on the boldness and self-expressiveness scales than the 'timid' options, to the percentage of participants who rated the 'timid' options higher on these scales. Similarly, we compared the percentage of participants who rated the 'timid' options higher on the conventionality and timidness scales than the 'bold' options, to the percentage of participants who rated the 'bold' options higher on these scales. As shown in Figure 2 , more than 70% indeed rated the 'bold' option as bolder than the 'timid' option. Results for the other scales are similar: more than 60% rated the 'bold' option as more selfexpressive, more than 50% rated the 'timid' option as more timid, and more than 70% rated the 'timid' option as more conventional (except for the LP-LQ option which was rated by only 47% as more conventional). Thus, there is a large consensus regarding which choices options are perceived as more bold and more self expressive, and which are perceived as more timid and more conventional.
Finally, the open-ended answers revealed that individuals indeed understood the meaning of 'timid' and 'bold' in this context in a manner similar to our conceptualization. Specifically, 30% perceived 'timid' choices as 'common, conventional behavior'; 29% perceived them as 'playing it safe', 18% as being cautious, and 5% as conservative behavior. The remaining 18% used other concepts (e.g., no commit; less expensive; quiet). In contrast, 37% rated 'bold' choices as 'behaving differently and standing out'; 20% as 'taking risks'; 15% as 'daring', 8% as 'brave', 8% as 'confident', and 3% as 'innovative. The remaining 9% used other constructs (e.g., aggressive, or good choice).
To summarize, in our first study we find wide consensus when classifying choice options as either more 'bold' or more 'timid'. Moreover, there is a clear understating of these constructs in the context of choice. In the next studies we turn to examine the effect of inducing bold (or timid) mindset on the making of a bold vs. timid choices.
STUDY 2: PRIMING BOLDNESS AND TIMIDNESS
The purpose of our second study was to examine the effect of priming boldness or timidness on the making of bold or timid choices. Building on the extensive literature on priming effects showing how automatic activation of constructs leads to various unconscious behavioral effect (e.g., Higgins 1996; Wheeler and Petty 2001), we hypothesize that activating the boldness (timidness) construct will lead to more bold (timid) choices, relative to a control condition. We activate these constructs using the sentence unscrambling task (e.g., Bargh & Chartrand 2000) , and compare choices between extreme and compromise options, between risky gambles and sure gains and between hedonic and utilitarian options.
Method
Participants (N=161, mean age = 32 years old, 30% male) were recruited through the online participants pool of Stanford university, and were offered a chance to win one of several $50-gift certificates in exchange for participating in the study. The study had three priming conditions: 'boldness', 'timidness', and 'neutral', operationalized through sentence unscrambling task, in which participants were asked to create a grammatically correct sentence using four out of the five words given.
The three conditions differed in the words embedded in the sentences. In the 'boldness' condition, the target words were : adventurous, bold, change, daring, deviate, differ, different, differentiate, distinguish, express, extraordinary, extreme, independent, individual, remarkable, risky, self, unconventional, unique, and unusual. In the 'timidness' condition the target words were: balance, cautious, common, conform, conservative, conventional, default, follow, imitate, maintain, moderate, ordinary, routine, safe, safety, same, similar, sure, timid, and traditional Manipulation check: Upon completing these tasks, participants were presented with an 'impression formation' task. Specifically, participants saw a shortened version of the 'Donald' description borrowed from Higgins, Rholes, and Jones (1977) , where some of the described behavior can be perceived as either 'adventurous and bold' or 'reckless' (e.g., "He was thinking, perhaps, he would do some skydiving or maybe cross the Atlantic in a sailboat", Higgins et al., 1977, p. 145) . Among other masking measures, participants were asked to describe in a single word Donald's attitudes toward outdoor activities. This description could focus either on being adventurous (which would imply activation of the 'bold' construct) or on being 'reckless' which would not imply activation of 'boldness'.
Participants then evaluated on a 7-point scale (1-not at all to 7-very much) how adventurous, reckless, timid, happy, smart and independent is Donald (the last three items were included to mask the purpose of the task).
Debriefing and Final Measures:
At the last part of the study participants completed the funneled debriefing form (Bargh & Chartrand 2000) to identify any suspicious or demand effects. Four participants (two from the 'boldness' condition and two from the 'timidness' condition) noticed the reoccurring topic in the sentences unscrambling task and were therefore excluded from analysis. No other suspicious effects were found. Participants also completed various mood and involvement measures. No differences were found across conditions.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation checks: Participants responses to the open ended question (describing Donald's attitudes) were coded and grouped into three categories:
'adventurous focus' descriptions (including: adventurous, bold, courageous, daring, and daredevil), 'reckless focus' descriptions (including: reckless, careless, dangerous, foolish, and stupid) and 'other' (including: energetic, fun, dedicated, risk, etc.). As expected, those in the 'boldness' priming condition were significantly more likely to classify Donald's behavior as 'adventurous' than in the other two conditions (X 2 (df = 4) = 9.603, p < .05; see Table 1 ). Moreover, those primed with 'boldness' were more likely to classify Donald's behavior as 'adventurous' on the 7-point scale compared to the other conditions (M boldness = 6.81, M control = 6.76, M timidness = 6.33, F (2, 158) = 6.49, p < .005).
Differences on the 'timid' scale (M boldness = 2.96, M control = 3.04, M timidness = 3.06) and 'reckless' scale (M boldness = 5.98, M control = 6.04, M timidness = 6.07) were not significant (F's < 1)
Hypothesis testing: As shown in Figure 3 , in all problem types, participants in the 'boldness' condition were more likely to choose the 'bold' option compared to participants in the 'timidness' and 'control' conditions. For example, across the three sure-risky problems, 36% of those primed with 'boldness' words chose the risky (i.e., bold) option, compared to 23% of those primed with 'timidness' or 'neutral' words.
Similarly, across the three compromise problems, 44% chose the extreme (i.e., bold) option when primed with 'boldness' compared to 36% in the 'control' condition and 31%
in the 'timid' condition. Finally, across the three hedonic-utilitarian problems, 57% chose the hedonic (i.e., bold) option when primed with boldness compared to 47% in both the 'control' and 'timidness' conditions.
In order to test the significance of these effects, we ran a series of logit models.
We created two dummy variables for the three conditions (control, boldness, and timidness) with the control group as the reference level. For each problem type, we created two dummy variables for the three different problems. We first ran a model with choice as the dependent variable (choice of the 'bold' option coded as '1'), the dummy variables for conditions, problems, and their interactions, as the independent variables.
As none of the interactions were significant (all p's > .3), we dropped these interactions to maximize power 1 .
In all problem types, the difference between 'bold' and 'control' conditions was significant (or marginally significant): For the sure-risky problems, Wald X 2 = 7.34, p < .005; for the hedonic-utilitarian problem: Wald X 2 = 3.6, p < .06, and for the compromise problems, Wald X 2 = 2.36, p < .12. The difference between 'timid' and 'control' is not significant in all problems (p's > .4).
Overall, our results suggest that when primed with 'boldness', consumers are more likely to choose 'bold' options, across the three problem types. However, priming 'timidness' does not increase the share of the 'timid' options. The finding that priming 'timidness' did not affect choice might be because the words in this task did not accurately tap the timidness construct. Recall that the manipulation checks did not reveal differences in the timidness rating of Donald's behavior across conditions. Alternatively, it is possible that it is easier to activate boldness than timidness, an issue we address more in the general discussion. In our next study we examine other inducers of 'bold' vs.
'timid' mindsets, such as choosing the choice domain.
STUDY 3: CHOOSING THE CHOICE DOMAIN LEADS TO BOLD DECISIONS
In our next studies we examine the effect of choosing the choice domain on the making of bold decisions. In many consumption situations, consumers choose the choices they wish to make. For example, they can choose whether they want to choose among restaurants or among movies. We propose that the mere action of choosing the choice domain may lead to increased choice of bold options within this chosen domain.
Relatively less attention has been given in the consumer behavior literature to the effects of two-stage decision processes on decision making. Chakravarti, Fishbach, Janiszewski, and Ülkümen (2007) show that this effect is strengthened after a time delay, suggesting this effect operates through a motivational route. Finally, in Study 5 we show that when the 'bold' option is framed as the status-quo option, the effect of choosing first the choice domain is eliminated.
Method
Participants (N=231, mean age=28, 28% male) were recruited through the online pool of Stanford university and were offered a chance to win one of ten $25-gift certificates for participating in the study. The study had a 2 (choose category manipulation: choose category first vs. control) X 2 (problems: group 1 (restaurants, MP3
players, posters, wines, cordless phones, laptops, cakes, hamburgers, raffles with gym and spa vouchers as prizes, raffles with vouchers to a clothing store as prizes) vs. group 2 (hotels, cell phones, carpets, towels, printers, digital cameras, granola bars, pizzas, raffles with vouchers to rent DVDs as prizes, raffles with vouchers to an electronics store as prizes)) between subjects design. All participants made hypothetical choices among various options, as detailed below.
About half of the participants were assigned to the 'choose category' condition and first chose in which category they want to make choices (e.g., among posters or among carpets). They were then randomly assigned to choose among products in one of the categories (categories in 'group 1' or 'group 2' above) regardless of their initial category choice (participants were told that we have enough data on the other category;
since the study was conducted online, this kind of cover story was plausible). Assigning participants to a certain category, somewhat overcomes the problem of self selection.
Moreover, assigning them to a given choice category created two distinct groups: 'match'
-those assigned to choose in their chosen category (e.g., those who chose to choose among posters over carpets and were later assigned to choose among posters) and 'mismatch' -those assigned to choose in the category they did not choose (e.g., those who chose to choose among carpets but were later assigned to choose among posters).
Participants in the control were assigned to choose either in categories from 'group 1' or 'group 2' above, without first choosing between categories.
Participants saw five types of problems: choice between all-average and mixedvalue options, between unique and standard objects, between HP-HQ and LP-LQ products, between vices and virtues, and between sure prizes and probable prizes (see Table 2 ) 2 . There were four replications of each type. However, in order to shorten the length of study, and to create the 'match' and 'mismatch' groups (see above), each participant made only ten choices (two of each type).
After making all choices, all participants were asked to rate their level of expertise and perceived knowledge in each of the categories, by answering these two questions on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) point scale: "How much do you think you know about [e.g., posters]?" and "How much do you think of yourself as an expert about [e.g., posters]?". As these two measures were highly correlated (across all problems, all r's > 0.7, p's < 0.001), they were combined to a single expertise-knowledge measure.
Results and Discussion
For each problem, participants in the 'choose category' conditions were classified as either 'match' (if they chose the category that was later assigned to them) or 'mismatch' (if they chose a category different from the one assigned to them).
As shown in Figure 4 , across all problem types, we find that those in the 'match' group were more likely to choose the 'bold' option compared to the 'control' condition.
Specifically, the share of the mixed-value option increased from 33% in control to 42%
in 'match' across the four problems (Wald X 2 = 3.54, p < .06) 3 ; the share of the unique option increased from 25% to 35% (Wald X 2 = 3.69, p < .06); the share of HP-HQ option increases from 57% to 68% (Wald X 2 = 3.49 , p < .06); the share of the extreme option increase from 32% to 43% (Wald X 2 = 3.77, p < .05); the share of the vice option increases from 52% to 61% (61% vs. 52%, Wald = 3.04, p < 0.08); and the share of the risky option increase from 15% to 22% (Wald X 2 = 1.9, p < .17). Moreover controlling for the combined knowledge-expertise measure does not change these results. Thus, even though consumers usually prefer to choose in categories they perceive themselves as having higher expertise and as more knowledgeable, this does not explain the obtained effects on subsequent choices made within these chosen categories.
Finally, as shown in Figure 4 , in the mixed-value, uniqueness, price-quality and vice-virtue problems there are no differences in choice behavior between the 'control'
and 'mismatch' groups, suggesting that only when consumers are choosing in their chosen category they are more likely to choose 'bold' options. However, we do find an increase in the share of the risky option (15% vs. 24%, p < .05) and in the share of the extreme option (32% vs. 40%, p > 0.1) even when choosing in the categories not chosen (the 'mismatch' group). Since this effect is obtained only in 2 out of the 6 problem types, it could be due to the specific problem used. Overall, we find a consistent pattern of increase in choosing bold options when choosing in the chosen domain. Another purpose of this study was to examine whether the effect of choosing first the choice domain is obtained also when choosing between innovative and traditional products. Recall that in Study 1 we found that choosing the innovative product (the IRoomba vacuum cleaner) is perceived as more 'bold' and 'self expressive' than choosing the traditional product (a top of the line Hoover vacuum cleaner), which in turn is perceived as more timid and conventional.
Finally, we wanted to rule out an alternative explanation that the effects obtained in Study 3 were due to mood effects obtained by our manipulation. Therefore, general mood measures were included at the end of this study and compared them across conditions.
Method
Participants (N=346, mean age=33, 30% male) were recruited through the online pool of Stanford university and were offered a chance to win one of several $25-gift certificates for participating in the study. The study had a 2 (choose category manipulation: choose category first vs. control) X 2 (problems: group 1 (restaurants, MP3 players) vs. group 2 (hotels, digital cameras, vacuum cleaners) X 2 (delay manipulation:
yes vs. no) between subjects design 5 . All participants made hypothetical choices among various products, as detailed below. The restaurant, MP3 player, hotel, and digital camera problems presented a choice between mixed-value and all-average options, and the vacuum cleaner presented a choice between traditional and innovative products.
The first factor (choose category) was manipulated as in Study 3. The second factor (problem) was also manipulated similar to Study 3: Specifically, half of the participants were assigned to choose between restaurants and MP3 players, and half were assigned to choose between hotels, digital cameras and vacuum cleaners.
The third factor -delay -was manipulated as follows. In the 'delay' conditions, participants first chose between categories, then they completed an unrelated sentence unscrambling task, and then they chose in the assigned choice categories. In the no-delay condition, participants completed the sentence unscrambling task prior to choosing between categories. Similarly, in the control conditions participants completed the sentence unscrambling task prior to choosing between products.
Finally, all participants completed general mood measures ("How happy do you feel right now", "How sad do you feel right now", "How excited do you feel right now'"
and "How irritable do you feel right now") and general involvement and confident measures ("How involved were you while you made the various choices today", "How carefully did you think while you made the various choices today", "How interested were you while you made the various choices today", and "How confident are you with the various choices you made today"). All measures were on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) 7-point scales. No significant differences on these measures across the experimental conditions (p's > .3).
Results and Discussion
As in Study 3, participants in the 'choose category' conditions were classified to 'match' and 'mismatch' groups. However, since the focus of this study was comparing the delay and no-delay conditions, the 'mismatch' groups are not analyzed further.
As shown in Figure 5 , across the two problem types, we (a) replicate the basic effect, i.e., find that those in the 'match' group were more likely to choose the 'bold' option compared to those in the 'control' condition, and (b) find an increase in the effect after the time delay. Specifically, the share of the mixed-value option increased from 39% in the control condition to 52% in the 'match no delay' condition (Wald X 2 = 4.3, p < .05) and to 60% in the 'delay' condition (Wald X 2 = 10.4, p < .005; the difference between 'match no-delay' and 'delay' is not significant, p > .2). Similarly, the share of the innovative product increased from 23% in the control condition to 33% in the 'match no delay' condition (Wald X 2 = 1.18, p = .27) and to 45% in the 'delay' condition (Wald X 2 = 4.56, p < .05; the difference between 'match no-delay' and 'delay' is not significant, p > .2). To summarize, in our forth study we replicate the effect of choosing the choice domain on choosing subsequently 'bold' options within this domain, and show that this effect is slightly intensified after a time delay (although the differences between the 'delay' and 'no-delay' are not significant).
STUDY 5: MAKING THE BOLD OPTION A STATUS-QUO OPTION
The purpose of our final study was to identify boundary conditions to the effect of choosing the choice domain on the making of bold decisions. Specifically, we wanted to examine if framing the 'bold' option as the status quo option eliminates the effect of choosing first the choice domain on choosing later the 'bold' option within the chosen domain. Presumably, if an option is the status-quo option and is therefore serving as a reference point (e.g., Samuelson & Zeckhauser 1988) , it is perceived as less 'bold' and more 'timid' and more conventional. Similar logic has been applied in previous research.
For example, Simonson et al. (2004) showed that framing a non-default option (a risky gamble or a HP-HQ option) as the status quo options, eliminates the effect of seeing others' choices. Specifically, when these options are not framed as the status-quo, learning that others have chosen them leads to an increase in the share of these options. In contrast, when they are framed as the status-quo, and are therefore perceived as default options, learning that other participants have chosen them leads to even a small decrease in their share.
In order to test the hypothesis that framing the bold options as the status-quo options eliminates the effect of choosing the choice domain on later choices, we manipulated whether the 'bold' option is the status quo option or not, in addition to manipulating whether participants first choose the choice domain or not (as manipulated in studied 3 and 4). Specifically, in the 'status-quo' condition, the 'bold' option was presented as the status-quo option (by asking participants to assume they have chosen this option); in the 'no-status-quo' condition, neither option was the status-quo option. As in Study 4, we included mood and involvement measures at the end of the study.
Method
Participants (N=228, mean age=34, 30% male) were recruited through the online pool of Stanford university and were offered a chance to win one of six $50-gift certificates for participating in the study. The study had a 2 (choose category manipulation: choose category first vs. control) X 2 (status-quo manipulation: yes vs. no) between subjects design. In contrast to studies 3 and 4, all participants saw all problems:
printers and laptops (price-quality), cell phones and restaurants (all-average), ice-creams and snacks (vice-virtue) and raffles with vouchers to a clothing store as prizes and raffles with vouchers to rent DVD movies as vouchers (sure-risky problems). As in studies 3 and 4, participants in the 'choose category' condition were first asked to choose between choice domains (for example, they chose whether they want to choose among printers or among bread makers), and were later all assigned to choose in a given category (printers, in the previous example). Participants in the control condition did not choose between categories, and were only asked to choose between products (e.g., between two printers).
Status-quo was manipulated as follows. For each problem, participants were asked to assume they consider buying a certain product. In the status-quo condition, they were asked to assume they have decided to purchase a certain option (which happened to be the 'bold' option -the mixed-value, the vice, the risky gamble, and the HP-HQ product). Then they read about another product from the same category and were asked whether they stay with their original choice, or switch to the other ('timid') option (see examples in Appendix 4). In the no-status-quo condition, none of the options was presented as the status quo and participants were presented with the two options (in the same order, i.e., the bold option first).
We included the same mood and involvement measures used in Study 4. No differences between conditions were found. As an additional measure of involvement, we asked participants at the end of the study to recall as many categories they remember making choices in. No difference across conditions were found, suggesting choosing the choice domain does not lead to increased involvement.
Results and Discussion
As shown in Figures 6A-6D , across all problems we replicate the basic choosecategory effect, and find an increase in the share of the 'bold' options when choosing in the chosen domain. Moreover, when the 'bold' option is framed as the status-quo option, this effect is eliminated.
Looking at the two vice-virtue problems ( Figure 6A ), we find the expected interaction between the choose-category manipulation and the status-quo manipulation (X 2 = 5.99, p < .05). Specifically, averaging across the two vice-virtue problems, we find that without the status-quo framing, choosing the choice domain increases the share of the 'bold' option (the vice option) from 53% in the control condition to 67% in the choose-category condition (X 2 = 3.74; p < .06). However, when the 'vice' option is framed as the status-quo option, there is even a small decrease in the share of the 'bold' option (69% to 65%, X 2 < 1).
Similarly, we find the expected interaction in the all-average problems (X 2 = 3.87, p < .05, see Figure 6B ). Specifically, the share of the mixed-value option increases when participants first choose category (from 29% to 40%, X 2 = 2.6, p = .1), but no such increase occurs when the mixed-value option is framed as the status-quo option (49% vs.
46%. X 2 <1);
Although the interaction in the price-quality problems is only marginally significant (X 2 = 2.38, p = .12), we find the same pattern of results (see Figure 6C ): with no status-quo framing, we find an increase in the share of the HP-HQ option from 39% to 55% following the choosing domain manipulation (X 2 = 4.7, p < .05), but no such increase when the HP-HQ option is framed as the status-quo option (X 2 <1).
Finally, when the 'risky' option is not framed as the status-quo, we find a significant increase in its share (14% vs. 33%, X 2 = 4.63, p < .05); this effect is eliminated when the risky option is framed as the status quo (24% vs. 22%, X 2 <1). The interaction is also significant (X 2 = 4.8, p < .05; Figure 6D ).
To summarize, in Study 5 we find that framing the 'bold' option (mixed-value, risky, vice, and HP-HQ) as the 'status-quo' option eliminates the effect of choosing the choice domain on choosing 'bold' options. Specifically, without the status-quo frame, choosing the choice domain leads consumer to choose more 'bold' options. However, when the 'bold' option is presented as the status-quo option, choosing the choice domain does not lead to this increase.
GENERAL DISCUSSION

Summary of finding
Across five studies we demonstrate a distinction between 'bold' and 'timid' choice options and the corresponding mindsets. In the first study, we find that there is large consensus when classifying certain options as more 'bold' and more 'self expressive' and other options as more 'timid' and 'conventional'. In the second study we find that priming with the 'boldness' construct leads consumers to choose more 'bold' options (namely, extreme, risky, and hedonic options). Priming timidness does not have an effect on choice. In studies 3-5 we examine the effect of choosing the choice domain on choices made within the chosen domain. Specifically, in Study 3, we demonstrate across 6 problem types that when consumers are first allowed to choose the domain in which they would make choices, they tend to choose more 'bold' options in this chosen domain. In Study 4 we replicate this effect and demonstrate that it is significantly stronger after a time delay, suggesting it operates through a motivational route. In Study 5, we find that when the 'bold' option is framed as the status-quo option, the effect of choosing the choice domain is eliminated.
Implications and future studies
Identifying similarities between different choice behaviors is important for our understanding of the factors underlying consumer decision making. Such research has the potential to better predict consumer choice in various contexts and provide a parsimonious explanation to this behavior. In this paper we attempt to provide such unifying framework by classifying a wide range of choice options as bold or timid, and exploring the conditions leading to choosing options of either type.
Although developing such unifying framework is important, it is clear that a classification of choice options as bold or timid does not apply in all cases and may depend on various situational and contextual cues as well as individual differences. As our findings of Study 5 suggest, framing the 'bold' option as the status-quo eliminates the previously observed effect of choosing the choice domain on choosing bold options.
Similarly, we expect that framing the 'bold' option as the option chosen by majority of consumers, or emphasizing the 'conventional' aspects of the 'bold' option (e.g., the highquality or a top-of-the-line product) is likely to make the option perceived as less bold.
Finally, in certain contexts, the role of 'bold' and 'timid' options may be reversed. For example, when choosing between medical treatments, where quality is more important and bears more risks than price, choosing the low-price low-quality treatment is likely to be perceived as more 'bold' while choosing the more-expensive higher-quality treatment is the 'timid' option.
As discussed in the introduction, one of the proposed components of 'bold' choices is self expression. The studies reported here do not directly test this connection between self expression and making bold decisions. At this point, we have preliminary data suggesting that when consumers first have an opportunity to express themselves, they are then more likely to choose 'bold' options. In one study, we find that after writing attributes that characterize the self, consumers choose significantly more extreme options compared to the control group. In a second study we find that when consumers first write about their hobbies, they are then more likely (although not significantly) to choose mixed-value and risky options, compared to those who were asked to write about their everyday experiences. Moreover, we find that those who wrote about their hobbies, felt is made them more bold, more adventurous, and provided them with a greater opportunity to express themselves, compared to those who wrote about their everyday experiences. In our future studies we intend to further explore the role of self expression on choosing 'bold' options, by using other manipulations of self-expression and examine the effect of these manipulations on a wide range of choice behaviors.
Another avenue for future research is identifying conditions that lead to more 'timid' choices. In the studies reported here, we observe only an increase in the share of the 'bold' options, following priming with the 'boldness' construct (Study 2) and following a choice of the choice domain (Studies 3-5). In future studies we seek to identify conditions that trigger a 'timid' mindset and leading to more 'timid' choices. One possible manipulation is providing (false) negative feedback on a relatively easy task (e.g., simple math problems). Our prediction is that when there is a threat to the self -in the form of negative feedback on performance -consumers will actually be more likely to choose the 'timid' options (or stated differently, less likely to choose 'bold' options), in order to minimize possible future risks.
We also seek to explore other choice contexts that may be classified as 'bold' or 'timid'. A potential choice context discussed briefly in previous sections is the tendency to defer choice and inaction (e.g., Dhar 1997). As consumers are frequently overwhelmed with choices and thus sometimes tend to defer them, understanding conditions that facilitate or inhibit choice deferral is important. Presumably, choosing to make a decision is more 'bold' than the alternative of deferring the decision. Thus, the manipulations tested in studies 2-5 are assumed to affect also choice deferral in the same manner, a hypothesis we plan testing.
Finally, the studies reported here tested mainly how situational factors affect consumers' choice between 'bold' and 'timid' options through the proposed activation of 'bold' or 'timid' mindsets. Relating back to the literature reviewed in the introduction, we seek to identify which individual predispositions predict 'bold' or 'timid' choice behavior. As discussed previosuly, the bold -timid distinction is related, among other constructs, to need for uniqueness, arousal seeking and regulatory focus. A measure of 'boldness' will be a combination of these measures, measuring also need for selfexpression.
The research presented here has also important managerial implications.
Specifically, this research suggests that marketers can create contexts that encourage the making of bold (or timid) decisions. For example, in online shopping, consumers frequently face sequential decisions that may affect their mindset. For example, after choosing the product category they are interested in, they can choose to sort results either by price or by brand, or by other dimensions. Possibly, sorting the search results by price may lead to a more timid mindset, whereas sorting by 'brand' may emphasize the quality domain and lead to a more bold mindset, thus affecting the final choice. The default sorting provided by the website may thus affect consumers' ultimate purchase decisions. 
